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Abstract: From 1945 to 1999, United States has used its military might to support an incumbent 
government in 16% of all civil wars. This paper seeks to understand what factors cause the 
United States to intervene militarily on behalf of the government in some civil conflicts but not 
in others. Understanding the causes for this armed response provides insight into the relationship 
between the hegemon and the client state. While there is an extensive literature looking at 
intervention in general, there is a dearth of information solely looking at United States military 
interventions. Moreover, the prevalent literature on intervention fails to address political 
proximity as a potential cause. This study assesses key elements that might affect the United 
States’ decision to intervene. In doing so, it adjusts prior measurement errors and fills the 
political proximity void. To foreshadow the results below, this study finds that political 
proximity, the measured difference in policy ideal points revealed through United Nations 
General Assembly voting trends, is a significant factor in the United States’ decision to provide 
military aid to an incumbent government. 
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Introduction 
Intrastate war is an increasingly common phenomenon in the years following World War 
II. Established governments and rebel groups are sacrificing blood and treasure in hopes of 
gaining or maintaining their respective political objectives. From 1945 to 1999, there were 150 
intrastate wars (Regan 2002) resulting in an estimated 16.2 million deaths (Fearon 2004). Civil 
wars often draw attention from the global community, which increasingly leads to third party 
military interventions. Interested third party states intervene in civil conflicts to shape the 
outcomes. Third party military interventions, however, extend the duration and costs—material 
and human—of these conflicts (Balch-Lindsey & Enterline 2000; Regan 2002; Fearon & Laitin 
2003; Hegre 2004; Collier et al. 2004; Regan & Aydin 2006; Cunningham 2010). Therefore, it is 
important to scrutinize the conditions under which a powerful state, such as the United States, 
would choose to intervene militarily on behalf of an incumbent government.  
The efficacy of intervention has drawn considerable attention from scholars. Researchers 
demonstrate that third party military intervention into civil wars complicate the bargaining 
process, which increases the costs associated with settlement (Walter 2009; Cunningham 2010). 
Further, an intervening party with a heavily mechanized force structure—tanks, helicopters, 
armored personnel carriers, etc.—significantly decreases the likelihood of success (Lyall 2010; 
Lyall & Wilson 2009). These conditions, however, tend to be present in conflicts in which the 
United States intervenes, so why intervene? What are the most prevalent factors that cause the 
United States to intervene militarily on behalf of the government in some civil conflicts but not 
in others?  
Scholars show that third party states often intervene in civil conflicts to secure their 
preferred outcomes (Cunningham 2010). The outcomes of civil wars can have profound impacts 
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on the international political order. By strengthening the incumbent government’s position at the 
bargaining table, powerful states, such as the United States, are intervening to ensure their 
interests are protected (Cunningham 2010). From 1945 to 1999, the United States used its 
military might to bolster a beleaguered government, and in turn protect its interests, in 16% of all 
civil conflicts (Regan 2002). This paper argues that political proximity—a measure of a client 
state’s willingness to support the intervener’s global agenda—is the main factor triggering this 
armed response.   
Many scholars have examined the dynamics leading to third party military intervention, 
but few have isolated the United States (Fordham 2008 and Yoon 1997 are notable exceptions). 
Furthermore, all fail to measure political proximity as a potential cause. Additionally, some 
studies inadequately measure other potential leading reasons for intervention. This paper assesses 
key elements that might affect the United States’ decision to provide an incumbent government 
with military support; it adjusts prior measurement errors to reflect reality better, and it fills the 
political proximity void. 
The United States’ status as a hegemonic Super Power places it in a position in which it 
can attempt to influence the outcome of any civil war. In fact, the United States intervenes more 
than any other state. By not inquiring specifically into the elements influencing these decisions, 
scholars might overstate the effects of key variables in all instances of military intervention. 
Moreover, the paucity of studies strictly looking into the cause for United States government-
biased military interventions could lead to a misunderstanding of the hegemonic order, which 
could render many foundational international relations theories void. In isolating instances of 
United States military interventions on behalf of an incumbent government and testing the 
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importance of political proximity, this paper advances the literature on the relationship between a 
hegemon and its client states.  
In the sections that follow, I first provide a parsimonious explanation, grounded in 
bargaining theory, for the purpose of third party intervention; I then review the prevailing 
literature on why the United States might intervene in general. Second, I present and explain my 
hypotheses and arguments for each school of thought. Third, I explain my data collection and 
methods. Then, I present and analyze my results. Finally, I conclude with a summary and a 
discussion on the implications of my findings. To foreshadow the results below, political 
proximity, as measured by United Nations General Assembly voting trends, is a significant 
factor in the United States decision to intervene militarily on behalf of a government.  
From this perspective, it appears that the United States is intervening in civil wars not to 
secure or protect the general welfare of the international community, as hegemonic stability 
theory purports, but for national gain. If hegemonic stability theory were to hold true, the United 
States, in an attempt to secure global public goods, would intervene regardless of United Nations 
voting patterns. The hegemon would seek to restore and secure stability around the globe to 
maintain an environment that will foster economic, technological, and political growth. This 
study, however, shows this is not the case.  
 Literature Review 
Definitions  
Before this study proceeds, civil war and military intervention need to be defined. In 
defining the former, scholars are hard pressed to find agreement. The main disagreement focuses 
on where to place the threshold of violence that distinguishes a civil war from other forms of 
political violence. (For an in-depth discussion on how different coding methods of civil wars 
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affects analysis outcomes see: Sambenis 2004). The Correlates of War project (COW) sets the 
high mark. Their coding methods require 1000 battlefield deaths within a 12 month period for an 
internal dispute to be classified a civil war. Other scholars place the threshold much lower. The 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo allows for conflicts that surpass 25 battlefield deaths 
per year per dyad to be classified an intrastate war (Gleditsch 2002). For the purpose of this 
study, I use a middle ground definition. In accordance with Regan’s (2002) study, my 
operational definition of a civil war is an armed resistance that surpasses a threshold of 200 
fatalities that resulted from organized combat between the belligerents throughout the duration of 
the conflict. 
The definition of military intervention is less divisive. Scholars define military 
intervention as any third party military act—from arms trades to naval and air support to the 
deployment of regular or covert military agents—that are convention breaking (above the current 
or conventional level supplied) and that target, either in support or in opposition of, the authority 
structure of the intervened state (Regan 1998; Aydin 2010). My study focuses on government-
biased military acts, military interventions in support of the incumbent government.  With these 
definitions established, I can move to explaining a framework useful in understanding the 
purpose for United States government-biased military interventions.   
Bargaining Theory  
In order to understand why the United States would choose to intervene militarily on 
behalf of an incumbent government, we must first understand the purpose for intervention. The 
foundational school of thought on the purpose of intervention is bargaining theory. Bargaining 
theory demonstrates that belligerents predict the probability of winning, the likely gains and 
losses from fighting, and the compromise, if any, they are willing make in lieu of fighting 
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(Fearon 1995; Powell 2002; Reiter 2004; Wagner 2007; Salehyan 2007; Walter 2009). The 
overlapping area of these compromise positions is the settlement zone—the policy area where 
the two sides can find agreement short of conflict. As Wagner (2007) explains, if the belligerents 
hold inaccurate beliefs about the other side’s capabilities (asymmetric information), one or both 
may overestimate their probability of winning and demand more in compromise. Moreover, if a 
belligerent is unsure of the other parties ability to follow through with negotiated compromises 
(creditable commitments), or if a warring faction is unwilling to budge from their stated position 
(indivisible stakes), a peaceful settlement will be allusive. The ensuing conflict, however, will 
reveal a more accurate picture of the other side’s relative strength (their probability of winning) 
and the likely gains or losses from continuing the fight (their opportunity costs), which could 
force one side to make concessions. This information will reset the settlement zone to reflect the 
true costs of continued warfare (Fearon 1995; Powell 2002; Reiter 2004; Thyne 2006; Wagner 
2007; Salehyan 2007; Walter 2009). 
The nature of civil war exacerbates all of the above-mentioned bargaining problems. The 
true strength of a rebel group is often hard to ascertain resulting in asymmetric information. The 
lack of in-group policing within a rebel group, the result of the often-decentralized organization 
of insurgencies, and the fear that the incumbent government will not follow through with its 
obligations in the negotiated settlements all create an environment unsuitable for creditable 
commitments (Fearon & Laitin 1996). Moreover, intrastate conflicts are often fought over issues 
in which neither side is willing to concede (Walter 2009). Third party interventions seek to 
address one or more of these problems, but in doing so, intervening third parties are also 
attempting to influence the outcome of the conflict to benefit their interests (Salehyan 2007).  
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If the incumbent government’s capabilities and likely losses move the settlement zone 
beyond the point the United States deems as in its national interests and if the benefits of 
intervening surpass the costs, the United States is more likely to intervene. United States 
government-biased military interventions aim is to shift the government’s compromise position 
by increasing its military capabilities. This increases the incumbent government’s likelihood of 
victory, fortifies its compromise position, and moves the settlement zone closer to the United 
States preferred policy outcome—the preservation of the status quo.  
The policy and situational nuances, which result in the United States providing military 
aid to an embattled government, are diverse and interacting. Nonetheless, the national interests of 
the United States are the driving force behind its decision. While this explanation provides a 
basic model for the intervention decision criteria—they seek to adjust the incumbent 
governments bargaining position to protect the status quo and the national interests of the United 
States—it does little to explain what these interests are. In the sections that follow, I explore the 
different schools of thought on the elements of national interest that might provoke the United 
States to provide an incumbent government military aid.  
Political Proximity 
On the international stage, states seek support for their actions or purposed actions as a 
way to help legitimize the stance they are taking. Nations rely on the consent, tacit or explicit, of 
other nations to advance their global agenda. This consent is an invaluable asset to nations—
even lone Super Powers, and many states will do all they can to ensure they gain political 
consent for their favored actions. In order to maintain international political backing, a nation 
will involve itself in an internal conflict to protect a favorable government. Therefore, if a nation 
is politically close to the United States, there will be an increased likelihood that the United 
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States will provide military support to the incumbent government. However, this seemingly 
crucial factor is missing in the prevalent literature on intervention.  
Political proximity is an indicator of a nation’s willingness to agree with or capitulate to 
another nation’s political wishes and interests. This willingness could influence the United 
States’ intervention decision-making. That is, in protecting its national interest on the 
international stage, the United States may intervene in civil wars to secure those leaders whom 
they find to be useful in advancing the United States’ agenda. While ideology may influence 
nations’ political proximity to each other, it is not a component of it. Nations with differing 
governing practices—Saudi Arabia and the United States (-10 and 10 respectfully on the Polity 
IV scale)—may share common interest, may vote in similar ways in international organizations, 
may join trading blocs together, and may form alliances with each other. Therefore, while their 
governing methods may differ, their political proximity to one another will be close.  
While there is a dearth of literature regarding the relationship between political proximity 
and interventions, other fields in international relations have looked into the effect of political 
proximity to the United States and the increased likelihood of terrorist attacks. Using voting 
trends in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as a proxy for political proximity, 
Dreher and Gassebner (2007) show that nations who vote more in line with the United States are 
more likely to be a victim of a terrorist attack. Their study does not differentiate between terrorist 
acts by external actors and those conducted by internal agents. Therefore, political proximity to 
the United States could be a cause for civil strife. Nonetheless, if the United States sees a 
government’s political proximity as important in securing or advancing its global agenda, it may 
be more willing to provide military support to combat insurgent groups.  
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Alliances are another component of political proximity and could determine whether the 
United States conducts a government-biased military intervention. Alliances are binding political 
agreements. Not all alliances are the same, but they all share one common thread. They show a 
willingness of parties to align with each another on certain issues (Leeds 2003). With no 
international enforcement mechanism, alliances must provide relative benefits to all parties. 
States will fulfill their alliance obligations only when it is in their national interest (Morrow 
2000). Fulfilling alliance obligations provides information about the commitment to and 
willingness of the intervening state to use force to protect its allies and interests (Morrow 2000). 
Alliances, however, might oblige a nation to enter a war it would not otherwise enter.  
Not fulfilling a commitment has political consequences and inflicts considerable costs on 
future actions. Not following through on obligations causes a state to lose credibility on the 
world stage—creating future commitment problems. The potential loss of credibility manipulates 
the costs to benefits equation. This makes states more likely to form alliances with other states 
who are closer politically, who possess something the stronger state has an interest in protecting, 
and/or who are less likely to see conflict (Leeds 2003). In this view, alliances should work as a 
pulling mechanism, making United States government-biased military interventions more likely 
to occur.    
  Alliances, however, pose difficult problems. As mentioned above, while alliances 
provide a strong indicator as to the closeness of two states, parties only form alliances, and only 
honor the obligations imposed on them, when it is in their self-interest to do so. That is, if the 
United States joins a defensive alliance, it is joining because it is in its self-interest to do so, and 
fulfilling its obligations serves to protect these interests. Economic ties increase the likelihood of 
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alliances forming (Fordham 2008); therefore, alliances could be an intervening variable between 
economic factors and the increase likelihood of intervention.  
Prior Interventions 
 The knowledge provided by prior IGO and state interventions offer critical information in 
determining the projected costs of future interventions. Further, this historical context shows the 
tenaciousness of the belligerents involved and serves as a prediction for the likelihood of future 
success (Aydin 2010). These figures could hold sway over the United States’ decision to 
intervene militarily on behalf of an incumbent government. 
The projected cost of intervening is a clear component in determining the gains to losses 
ratio. Of the two types of intervening parties, IGOs and states, Aydin demonstrates that 
successive third party interventions are less likely to occur when the prior intervening party was 
an IGO (2010).  IGOs are able to distribute the costs of interventions across the coalition. This 
allows IGOs to enter more costly conflicts. Therefore, prior interventions by IGOs demonstrate 
not only the likelihood of success, but also the exponential costs associated with intervening 
(Aydin 2010). This projected increase in costs should make United States government-biased 
military intervention less likely.  
The relative intensity of a conflict shows the potential probability for losses, both 
monetary and human, that the intervener might incur. Scholars examine the intensity of the 
conflict—average number of deaths per month over the course of the conflict—as a cause for 
intervention, and show mixed results. Some scholars demonstrate that the intensity of the conflict 
does not reduce the likelihood of intervention (Aydin 2010), while others indicate that intensity 
does reduce this likelihood (Regan 1998). In the former, Aydin (2010) shows that the frequency 
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of interventions by states and IGOs increases with intensity because intervening parties are 
concerned with the brutality of these wars.  
In her study, Aydin shows that decision-makers gain knowledge of intensity from other 
interventions; they use this information to reveal potential costs and the likelihood of success 
(Aydin 2010). In this manner, intensity could be a leading factor in the United States’ decision to 
intervene. However, in intrastate conflicts, accurate death tolls are hard to determine. To hinder 
the government’s ability to assess properly the relative strength and capabilities of the rebellion, 
an insurgent group has an incentive to distort or conceal information about their total losses 
(Walter 2009). As shown above, this information asymmetry has a dynamic effect on bargaining 
positions. 
Moreover, scholars show that intensity increases the duration of the conflict, which 
further increases the total cost (Hegre 2004; Regan 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). This line of 
reasoning stands in contradiction to Aydin’s findings. If intensity increases duration and costs, 
and prior interventions provide an indicator for the likelihood of success, then the United States 
should be less likely to intervene in conflicts with prior interventions and higher intensity rates. 
However, if other benefits gained from intervening are substantial and outweigh the projected 
costs, United Sates government-biased military intervention might be the course of action.  
Humanitarian 
Humanitarian crises and the public outcry they create can force the hand of political 
actors. In order to gain reelection, officials in democracies such as the United States must 
respond to their constituents’ demands. Media coverage of humanitarian crises—famines, heavy 
refugee flows, mass killings—affects public opinion and can help drive policy decision to 
intervene. If public opinion in favor of intervention is strong, the United States government will 
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be more likely to intervene. However, a cursory glance at United States interventions shows a 
level of vacillation in how the United States government responds to humanitarian crises.   
Scholars posit that interventions into conflicts that have sparked humanitarian crises are 
the result of general concern for the wellbeing of non-combatants (Aydin 2010). Researchers 
find that humanitarian concerns significantly increase the probability of intervention. Regan 
(1998) explains that governments could be intervening in response to domestic pressures. As 
humanitarian crises unfold and as media agencies broadcast the plight of the people, public 
support for intervention grows. This support could force the United States government to 
respond with a government-biased military intervention. These studies, however, encompass all 
forms of interventions—military, economic, diplomatic, and peacekeeping—from all third 
parties. By including all forms of interventions, scholars are able to show which form of 
involvement produces the most favorable outcome. This is helpful in providing policymakers a 
greater understanding on the effects of their potential courses of action, but a dataset that 
comprises all forms of intervention might be overstating the affect humanitarian crises have on 
the United States government’s  decision to use its military complex in support of an embattled 
government.   
In a study examining the effects of refugee flow on the onset and continuation of 
intrastate wars, Salehyan (2007) shows that refugees contribute significantly to the duration of 
the conflict. He shows that refugee camps provide fertile soil for rebel recruitment. The 
conditions in the camps and the events that forced their creation lower the opportunity costs of 
the potential recruit (Salehyan 2007). Further, a large number of refugees increase the potential 
for diasporas. This pool of willing fighters and the increased remittances rebels may receive 
extend the duration of the conflict (Salehyan 2007). Similar to other causes that prolong internal 
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violence, heavy refugee flow increases the potential costs associated with intervention, which 
could result in the government not receiving United States military aid.        
Moreover, when the United States does take action, the response to these humanitarian 
crises may not be as altruistic as it looks. Motives other than humanitarian concerns could be the 
true causes of government-biased military intervention. While United States politicians often 
present interventions to the public as a means to address humanitarian concerns, international 
political benefits are likely candidates for the true motives behind these actions. The 1948 United 
Nations Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide demonstrates the near global 
commitment of eliminating this scourge. However, collective action problems are present. In 
conflicts where more than one outside party will benefit from intervention in a humanitarian 
crisis, we see an increased probability that no party will intervene in hopes that the others will do 
so (Gent 2007). They hope to gain the benefits without sacrificing the costs. Interventions in 
humanitarian crises are therefore more likely to be unilateral and self-interested (Gent 2007). 
This could indicate that, while the United States is intervening in humanitarian crises, the 
purpose for this intervention could be something entirely different.    
While the United States intervenes to address humanitarian concerns—famine in 
Somalia, it also has other incentives for doing so—protecting the shipping lanes in the Gulf of 
Aden. These self-interested motivations for intervention are lacking in cases of non-intervention 
like Darfur and Rwanda. It could be that these cases are examples of when the potential losses 
outweighed the projected gains from intervening. International political and economic motives 
rather than domestic political incentives and humanitarian concerns could be the true causes of 
United States government-biased military intervention. Thus, while humanitarian concerns may 
play a part in the decision to intervene, their true effects are unknown.  
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Economic  
If a nation becomes embroiled in a civil war, trade dependence and other economic 
factors might warrant the United States to provide the incumbent government with military aid. 
If the incumbent government has strong trade ties with the United States, it might seek to 
stabilize the nation in order to protect its economic interests. Based on the rational choice model 
of intervention—third party nations only involve themselves in conflicts that benefit their 
national interests (Lemke & Regan 2004)—intuitively, it would seem that countries rich in 
strategic natural resources (oil and gas) and/or that have strong trade ties with the United States 
would be likely recipients of military support. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) provide a 
theoretical explanation for this. They posit that leaders in the United States will find intervention 
a more attractive option if the target state is rich in goods such as energy resources or if it is 
critical in securing trade routes, both of which lower the costs of private and public goods in the 
United States thus benefiting large portions of their selectorate. 
A study, however, looking into the likelihood of intervention in countries at-risk of civil 
war indicates this is not the case. Regan (2010) shows that trade openness is not a factor in the 
decision to intervene before the outbreak of civil war. This study, however, only examines trade 
openness and does not exclusively look at trade ties between the target state and the intervening 
party. The failure to examine trade ties and trade dependency could result in a misrepresentation 
of the importance trade has on the decision to intervene.   
A related study also demonstrates that economic ties were not a significant factor in the 
United States’ decision to intervene in either civil or international war (Fordham 2008). This 
study, however, only recorded United States exports to the target state, which may also 
misrepresent the importance of economic ties. While exports do represent economic ties, they are 
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only part of the story. The weight of the United States’ import reliance is missing in this 
equation. Imports play a key role in the smooth functioning of the United States economy; 
therefore, by excluding this element, scholars might be missing an important causal relationship. 
While the importance of trade has not been fully examined in relation to the United States 
interventions in civil conflicts, trade relations during the Cold War have been shown to effect the 
Soviet Union’s decision to intervene. Closeness of trade ties helped predict whether the Soviet 
Union would intervene in internal or international disputes (Kaw 1990).  
Other studies examining the effects trade has on conflict initiation provide intriguing 
results. The literature on international behavior provides evidence of the effects trade ties and 
trade networks have on the onset of militarized interstate disputes. Dorussen and Ward (2010) 
advance the Kantian peace theory by showing a relationship between the density of trade 
networks and the reduced likelihood of militarized interstate disputes. They show that there is a 
decreased likelihood of war between dyadic trading partners directly (direct trade) and triadic 
trading relationships indirectly (trade networks). They explain that the causes for this 
pacification are national interest and the positive effects trade networks have on 
communication/information gathering—an element established as critical to a proper 
understanding of each other’s bargaining position (Dorussen & Ward 2010). While this study 
only looks at interstate dispute initiation, its findings may be applicable to civil war 
interventions. An increase in communication also increases the potential for cooperation. 
Therefore, having strong dyadic ties might encourage the United States to support a 
government’s effort against an internal combatant.     
Scholars also deliver evidence that economic ties, via export figures, have an indirect role 
on intervention decision-making. Economic ties increase the likelihood of an alliance forming 
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between the United States and the trade partner, and alliances increase the likelihood of 
intervention when civil violence breaks out. Therefore, economic ties are indirectly related to 
interventions (Fordham 2008) and could play a central role in the decision of the United States to 
provide the incumbent government military aid. 
Liberal Democratic Ideals 
An often-asserted interest of the United States, which might lead to military intervention, 
is the advancement of liberal democratic ideals. The promotion of liberal ideals throughout the 
world has been a cornerstone of United States foreign policy since the Wilson administration 
(1913-1921). The notion of “making the world safe for democracy” has influenced the actions 
and developed the stated interests of the United States for nearly a century. Theories to justify 
these actions abound. Democratic peace theory—democracies seldom fight each other—
addresses this specifically. The United States gains added benefit in assuring a nation is and 
remains under a government that does not have drastically differing governing principles. If 
these more democratically likeminded governments become threatened, the United States has an 
interest in protecting them and thus will be more likely intervene on their behalf.  
Policies and practices of the United States during the Cold War help support this line of 
thought. Many scholars posit that United States military interventions during the Cold War were 
most likely a factor of containment politics—the  prevention of the spread of divergent ideals 
(Yoon 1997; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004, Fordham 2008). During the Cold War, the 
official explanation for United States intervention was to prevent the spread of communism. 
Scholars, policymakers, and politicians established the domino theory—if one country falls to 
communism so too will its neighbors—as justification for interventions. The Cold War eased 
constraints on decisive unilateral decision-making and domino theory justified it. Nations do not 
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operate in a vacuum. The actions of a country affect the behavior of its neighbors and other 
interested third parties, particularly the United States and the former Soviet Union.   
In the post-Cold War era, the effect that liberal democratic ideals have on the decision to 
intervene has not received much direct attention. The ever-looming threat of a rival Super Power 
has disappeared taking with it defining ideological monikers, thus domino theory subsided as an 
impetus for intervention. Ideology, however, might still play an important role in the decision to 
intervene. One of the stated interests of the United States in the 2003 war with Iraq was to make 
it a “beacon of democracy in the Middle East”. However, the extent to which this mattered in the 
decision to intervene seems to be slight. Further, there are examples of United States 
interventions on behalf of governments whose governing ideals venture far from the liberal 
democratic ideals the United States seems to promote. 
A recent study refutes the theories that the United States intervenes to establish 
democracies and that they intervene more often when the potential target state scores higher on 
the Polity IV scale (Bueno de Mesquita & Downs 2006). The study states that the United States 
has an interest in making sure target states remain marginally democratic and shows that the 
United States is more likely to intervene in nations that are less democratic (Bueno de Mesquita 
& Downs 2006). The study uses time series analysis to look at the growth of democratic 
principles (using Polity IV scores) in nations ten years after an intervention through the ten after 
the end of occupation—in cases of no intervention, the study looked at the growth of 
democracies ten years after the end of hostilities.  
In analyzing their findings, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) show why this is. 
They point to the idea that less democratic regimes have a smaller selectorate—the population 
that keeps officials in power—to please than democratic regimes. These regimes are therefore 
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more able to ensure that the United States will receive a favorable portion of the private goods 
the state produces, which will help please the selectorate in the United States (Bueno de 
Mesquita & Downs 2006). Moreover, the United States is more likely to intervene in less 
democratic states because, by allowing a target state to advance on the democratic scale slightly, 
they are able to please other portions of the United States selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita & 
Downs 2006). Further, in intervening and supporting less-than-democratic governments, the 
United States is more able to ensure, because of the lack of liberal democratic ideals such as 
elections, that the established relationship—the distribution of power and resources—will remain 
intact. Through this study, it seems that the government-biased military intervention decision 
criteria used by United States officials is not affected by concerns regarding the promotion or 
preservation of liberal democratic ideals, but is more concerned with securing the status quo. 
From a hypothetical prospective, one can see why this might be the case. The United 
States will be more willing to support and protect a friendly but non-democratic government with 
military aid because it has confidence that the embattled state will remain loyal after the conflict 
has ended. By nature of being non-democratic, the incumbent government does not have to fear 
losing power in an election, and the United States does not have to worry that an election will 
result in an anti-American regime replacing a cooperative government. Therefore, once the 
rebellion is put down, there is added confidence that a non-democratic government will secure 
and maintain the status quo distribution for the foreseeable future. This non-democratic dynamic 
serves as an insurance plan for the United States. The lack of elections and the private goods a 
non-democratic government can promise underwrite the cost of military intervention. 
Conversely, if the embattled government is more democratic, regardless of the outcome of the 
civil war, there is a strong likelihood that the government, loathed by a portion of the selectorate, 
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could be voted out of office and replaced with a government hostile to the United States. 
Therefore, in intervening to protect a more democratic government, the United States runs the 
risk of forfeiting the costs and projected gains of providing military support to a government.    
Despite previous finding, the role liberal ideals play in the decision to provide an 
incumbent government military aid deserves further review. If, however, the findings of Bueno 
de Mesquita and Downs (2006) hold, other factors and benefits must be the cause for United 
States government-biased military interventions. It could be that, regardless of a government’s 
ideology, the decision to intervene might be a product of the favorable political actions or 
positions the targeted government makes or takes. Ideology could be giving way to political 
proximity.  
Geopolitical 
Geopolitical issues—shared borders, regional stability, and cross-border sanctuary—
might factor into the United States’ decision to intervene. Spillover theory states that conflict in 
one state might incite conflict in a neighboring state (Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan 2007). Conflict 
in adjacent states increase the availability and decreases the cost of weaponry. Further, these 
conflicts can provide effective training for potential rebels, all of which lowers the opportunity 
costs of a rebellion (Collier et al 2004; Hegre 2004). Likewise, conflicts in neighboring states 
might provide a rebel group an opportunity to take advantage of a weak neighbor’s inability to 
patrol and secure its borders, allowing rebel factions to gain sanctuary (Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan 
2007; Lyall & Wilson 2009; Lyall 2010).  
To protect against the spread of rebellion, neighboring countries should intervene more 
regularly. Hence, as the number of contiguous states increases, so to should the likelihood of 
third party intervention.  Recent literature, however, demonstrates that an increase in the number 
21 
 
of bordering states reduces the likelihood that the country will receive third party support (Regan 
1998). Regan (1998) shows the presence of a collective action problem—each neighbor state is 
expecting the others to do the work for all. Regan’s study looks at all conflicts and all potential 
third party interventions. This approach, however, may mask the effect geopolitical conditions 
have on United States military involvement on behalf of the government. The United States 
might intervene because of the concern of spillover and others’ inaction. Hegemonic stability 
theory supports this notion. The theory posits that a hegemon, the United States, will involve 
itself in conflicts to secure the global welfare; it will intervene to ensure regional stability, which 
promotes economic advancements. Therefore, to prevent civil conflicts from disrupting the 
economic and technological advances that stabilize and “locks-in” the international order, which 
promotes the global welfare, the United States should intervene more regularly. Therefore, the 
likelihood of intervention for stability concerns should be commensurate to the number of 
contiguous states.   
In addition, an increase in the number of bordering states also increases the chances of 
the rebel group finding cross-border sanctuary. Cross-border sanctuaries increase the duration 
and costs of civil wars (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Fearon 2004; Gleditsch 2007; 
Salehyan 2007; Lyall & Wilson 2009; Lyall 2010). The chances of an insurgent group finding 
cross-border sanctuary increase if a neighboring state is politically and/or militarily weak or if it 
is sympathetic to the rebel cause. Sympathies might rise out of shared ethnic identities—
Ugandan sanctuary of Rwandan Tutsi—or from shared rivalries—Liberia’s sanctuary of rebels 
from Sierra Leone (Salehyan 2007). Further, weak governments in neighboring countries cannot 
patrol border frontiers sufficiently. Therefore, the greater the number of bordering states, the 
more likely rebel groups will find sanctuary (Salehyan 2007; Lyall & Wilson 2009; Lyall 2010). 
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Due to sovereignty considerations, cross-border sanctuaries limit the embattled government’s 
ability to pursue rebels (Salehyan 2007). Consequently, civil wars in which the rebel group gains 
sanctuary last longer than those where no sanctuary is provided (Fearon 2004; Salehyan 2007). 
Additionally, rebellions with safe havens are more successful than those without them (Lyall and 
Wilson 2009; Lyall 2010).  
By increasing the duration and decreasing the probability of success, cross-border 
sanctuary and outside support increase the costs associated with intervention, which might 
reduce the likelihood of United States intervention. However, if hegemonic stability theory is 
correct, these geopolitical dynamics should not affect the likelihood of United States 
government-biased military intervention. That is, regardless of these cost-increasing components, 
the hegemon, the United States, will intervene to bring peace to the region, which will allow 
states to enter the global economic system. If, however, these elements discourage United States 
interventions or if they are insignificant, hegemonic stability theory might be flawed. 
Arguments and Hypotheses 
The literature points to a number of leading causes that might result in the United States 
using its military might to protect a government engaged in battle with an internal enemy. The 
literature, however, leaves questions unanswered and causes unexplored. Most notably, the 
literature fails to examine the effect of political proximity on the United States’ decision to 
provide military aid to an incumbent government.  Moreover, some schools of thought have held 
truer through time, while others seem to have diminished as history moved forward. 
Additionally, a number of studies have failed to measure adequately certain phenomena when the 
decision to intervene is made, have failed to take a complete measure of projected causes, or 
have overlooked a promising potential cause all together. While the leading schools of thought 
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show many important elements, they overlook the importance of political proximity, shown 
below to be a significant element in the United States’ government-biased military intervention 
decision criteria.  
What follows are arguments and hypotheses for the leading schools of thought. I place 
these hypotheses in an order that represents what I feel will be the general importance of the 
variables—most likely to be significant first and least likely to be significant last. A notable 
deletion from these hypotheses is one related to humanitarian concerns. For reasons associated 
with data availability and reliability, this study cannot provide a testable hypothesis for 
humanitarian factors for United States military involvement i.e. refugee crises or genocide.  
Regan (1998) and Salehyan (2007) both acknowledge the difficulty in examining the 
effects of humanitarian crises.  For example, Regan’s coding methods for refugee crises provide 
an indicator ex post of the decision to intervene. In coding for the presences of a refugee crisis, 
he investigates to see if the civil war triggered the migration of at least 50,000 citizens (Regan 
1998). This measure is taken after the fact and it is unknown if the refugee flow met this 
threshold before or after the decision on intervention was made. By not providing a measure at 
the point in time when the decision to intervene is made, these figures do little to advance our 
understanding of the elements that lead to intervention. Other variables, however, lend 
themselves to easier operationalization and can provide clues regarding the leading causes for 
United States government-biased military intervention.  
Favorable voting trends in international institutions and contractual alliances might also 
explain intervention. The United States might see the distressed state’s revealed political position 
in the international fray as strategically important and an alliance treaty might obligated it into 
action. The state might continually vote in line with the United States on important issues in 
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international institutions. These voting patterns reveal nations relative position in policy debates 
in ways that proclaimed or measured ideology cannot. Voting trends provide the United States 
with information regarding a nation’s ideal point—the policies and actions they find worthy of 
support. When compared against the United States’ voting patterns, the voting trends of a state 
reflect its political proximity to the United States. The political proximity of a nation to the 
United States could provoke it to action. This provides the foundation for hypothesis 1:  
H1.  As political proximity components increase—UNGA voting patterns and 
alliances, so too will the probability of United States government-biased military 
intervention.   
The United States will intervene in losing causes to protect vital political alliances—
institutional and contractual. These voting patterns and contractual obligations are seen as 
valuable in the promotion of the United States interest and must be protected.  
The likelihood of success and the costs of an intervention are prevalent factors in all 
schools of thought; however, few provide a more adequate projection of these two determining 
factors than prior interventions. The decreased probability of success could deter the United 
States from intervening. As a democratic nation, the risk of failure lingers heavy on the minds of 
politicians. The domestic political fall-out from engaging in a losing government-biased military 
intervention could result in the elected leaders losing the subsequent election. Prior interventions 
also provide information on the relative costs associated with intervention. As stated above, 
IGOs are more willing to take on costly endeavors. Therefore, prior interventions by IGOs signal 
to the United States that any intervention is going to be very costly. This leads to hypothesis 2: 
H2.  An increase in the number of prior IGO interventions will decrease the 
probability the government will receive United States military aid.  
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If the United States has strong economic ties with the state in distress, it may be more 
willing to intervene. Economic concerns are often major components of international policies, 
and economic gains are always on the minds of political leaders. Trade ties and dependencies are 
of great importance to the United States. When these elements are properly measured and 
understood, their significant impact should be seen. Therefore: 
H3.  As economic ties increase, United States government-biased military 
intervention will be more likely.  
During the Cold War, the United States maintained a strict containment policy. It sought 
to ensure that non-aligned and pro-Western countries remained under the control of neutral or 
friendly governments. Therefore, in civil wars that took place from 1945 to 1990, ideology 
should be a determining factor in the United States decision to intervene militarily on behalf of 
the incumbent government. After the Cold War, ideology became harder to define, but if the 
incumbent government shares similar liberal democratic ideals the United States might seek to 
secure that government from danger, which establishes hypothesis 4:  
H4.  The more liberal the incumbent government ideology is the more likely 
the government will receive United States military support. 
As mentioned above, with an increase in the number of shared borders, the risk of rebel 
groups gaining cross-border sanctuary also increase. Moreover, if the government in a 
neighboring state is a rival of the incumbent government in the target state, rebels will have a 
greater chance of finding cross-border sanctuary. If a rebel group gains sanctuary, the conflict is 
more likely to last longer than average. This duration increasing element makes intervention 
more costly. Therefore: 
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H5.  As the number of shared borders increases, the likelihood of the United 
States intervening militarily will decrease;  
H6.  if a neighboring state is a rival, the likely probability of United States 
government-biased military intervention will decrease.  
Data and measures 
My Sample and Dependent Variable 
Time and resources limited my ability to collect original data. The data I organized for 
this paper were collected and coded by multiple scholars for many different uses. Many scholars 
use different coding rules and thresholds making merging datasets difficult. Further, while I took 
care to ensure I organized these data to represent the most accurate picture possible, for many of 
my independent variables, I have missing cases.  
Regan’s 2002 work on third party intervention is the base of my dataset. In his 2002 work 
“Third Party Intervention and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict”, Regan records all internal 
conflicts that breach the 200 fatalities threshold and any interventions—military and/or 
economic—that took place during the course of the conflict.  
His observations, however, are in conflict-months. My observations are the conflicts 
themselves. Therefore, in order to get an accurate picture, I use Regan’s work to build a dataset 
that encompasses all civil wars and any United States government-biased military interventions. 
To do so, I selected the first observation provided in which the United States militarily 
intervened on behalf of the government. In cases of no U.S. intervention, I selected the first 
reported observation, selecting IGO interventions (coded 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 unique to Regan 2002) 
over other third parties. This process produced a unique dataset of 150 civil conflicts from 1945 
to 1999. Regan (2002) specifically coded for military government-biased intervention and 
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provided the Correlates of War country code for the intervener. With this, I was able to compile 
my binary dependent variable. I code a 1 for all instances in which there was a United States 
government-biased military intervention. All other conflicts are coded 0. Of the 150 conflicts, 
there are 24 instances of my dependent variable.  
Independent Variables 
UN Roll Call (Ideal Points). The literature on political proximity uses United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) voting records as a measure. A nation’s proximity to the United 
States is the ratio of UNGA votes it casts in alignment with the United States over those it casts 
in opposition (Reed et al 2008; Dreher & Gassebner 2007). UNGA voting trends in favor of pro-
United States policies and/or initiatives shows a tacit alignment with the United States agenda. 
This orientation shows the willingness of a nation to yield to the wishes of the United States. 
My main variable to indicate political proximity is the divergence of preferences, 
revealed ideal points gained through United Nations General Assembly roll call voting trends, of 
target states to the United States. To figure out the revealed ideal point of all nations, Reed et al 
(2008) set states on a -1 to 1 spectrum. All NATO members are coded as -1 and Warsaw Pact 
member-states are code as 1. Non-aligned states are coded as 0. All votes a state made in a 
particular year in support of the status quo are scored as -1 and those in support of revisionist 
policies are scored 1. These figures give the nation’s average voting score per year, which 
reveals its ideal point on the -1 to 1 spectrum. I subtracted the target nations average score for the 
year prior to the start of the conflict to the United States average score (U.S. mean score for all 
years in my sample is -.865). I then took the absolute value of the difference. This gave me a 0 to 
2 spectrum, with 0 equaling close alignment to the United States and support of the status quo 
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and 2 equaling complete diversion from the United States and support of revisionist policies. The 
range of this variable was .006 (Paraguay in 1946) to 1.7813 (Soviet Union in 1987). 
Allied status. Allied status is a dummy variable showing whether the target government 
had an alliance with the United States the year prior to the start of conflict. This information was 
compiled using data from the COW project. The conflict was coded a 1 if an alliance—defensive 
or entente—was in place in the year prior and 0 otherwise (Gibler & Sarkees 2004). As 
mentioned above, alliances indicate a level of political proximity the United States has with a 
nation. 
Prior IGO Interventions. Using Regan’s 2002 dataset, I was able to form a variable 
indicating the total number of IGO interventions a conflict received. If the conflict witnessed a 
United States government-biased military intervention, I entered the number of IGO 
interventions that occurred prior to United States involvement. If there was no United States 
government-biased military intervention, I recorded the total number of IGO interventions. 
Trade Dependence. Trade dependence is calculated using data from the Correlates of 
War project (Barbieri et al. 2008). This project collected data on national trade and dyadic trade. 
Once I segregated the United States’ information, I calculated the total trade of the United States 
(exports + imports = Total U.S. trade) for each year of my sample. Further, I added the imports 
and exports that the target state had with the United States to get a figure representing the total 
flow of goods between the two states (U.S. imports from Country B + U.S. exports to Country B 
= U.S. Trade with Country B). I then divided this number by the total trade the United States had 
in that particular year. This gave me a figure indicating the total trade dependence the United 
States had with the target state (U.S. Trade with Country B/Total U.S. trade = Total U.S. trade 
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dependence). To avoid the endogenous problems the conflict might have on trade, I used the 
trade figures for the year prior to the start of the conflict.  
Liberal Democratic Ideals. I measure this variable using Polity IV scores. This score 
measures the presence of liberal government practices. It places states on a -10 to 10 scale. -10 
represents non-liberal government policies and practices and 10 represents democratic liberal 
government policies and practices. I have two testable variables here. (1) I recorded the average 
score the state received throughout the duration of the conflict or up until the United States 
intervened. (2) Acknowledging that conflicts are more likely to take place in states in the middle 
of the polity scale, I took the mean of all polity scores at the beginning of the conflict and then 
recorded the difference of the states’ score to the mean. This allows me to set a baseline and then 
measure deviation from it. By reordering the scale in this manner and taking difference from the 
mean, I am able to determine the extent liberal democratic ideals play on my dependent variable.  
Due to dataset coding irregularities, I cannot form a variable indicating if a rebel group 
did indeed receive cross-border sanctuary. I am however, able to present proxies for this; shared 
borders and rival neighbors will serve as strong indicators.  
Shared Borders. For each conflict, I referenced a map for the year before the conflict 
started. From here, I was able to determine the total number of neighboring state. This variable 
will allow me to see if a collective action problem is a pull or push factor for the United States.  
Rival Neighbor. Drawing from Salehyan’s (2007) work, I was able to develop a variable 
indicating whether one of the neighboring states was a rival to the incumbent government. This 
will provide information on key geopolitical factors. 
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Methods 
Due to the binary nature of my dependent variable, I use probit regression models to 
assess the correlation between the United States’ decision to provide government-biased military 
aid in a civil war and my explanatory variables. Moreover, because some countries seem more 
prone to civil wars than others do, I use Stata to cluster my observations.  
To assess which of my independent variables have the greatest influence on the decision 
of the United States to conduct a government-biased military intervention, I ran a number of 
probit regression models. The first is a model consisting of all variables of interest. After which, 
I systematically removed variables shown to be insignificant and/or those that are duplicate 
proxies for the same underlying school of thought i.e. the number of shared borders and neighbor 
rivals. Both of these variables seek to prove the geopolitical line of reasoning—cross-borders 
sanctuary reduces United States involvement. Therefore, if one or both are insignificant, I 
removed the variable that has the largest p value from the model to see if it was interfering with 
the other(s).  
Findings and Analysis 
This study seeks to determine what factors contribute to the decision of the United States 
to use its military might in support some of incumbent governments in their fight against internal 
belligerents and not others. Table 1 shows the results of the probit models. The models provide 
interesting conclusions. In particular, they show the importance of political proximity in the 
decision of the United Sates to provide government-biased military support. Below, I discuss the 
implications these results have on my hypotheses. Three hypotheses deal with cost-increasing 
elements—collective action problems, cross-border sanctuary, and prior intervention, and three 
deal with benefit gaining factors—economic trade, democracy, and political proximity. I address 
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each of these hypotheses directly. The models show support for some hypotheses, while others 
are left wanting. Moreover, the results show the interaction between variables. 
Political Proximity. I have two variables with which to test the importance of political 
proximity: allied status and ideal points as revealed through United Nations General Assembly 
roll call votes. Ideal points are the most fruitful variable in my set. Allied status, however, is 
significant only when I remove ideal points from the model. When I remove allied status from 
my test, the coefficient and p value of ideal points rise; therefore, it would seem that allied status 
is an intervening variable. This is consistent with the theory that states only form alliances with 
nations that are close to them and that are less likely to go to war.  
Political proximity as measured by ideal points revealed through UNGA voting trends is 
an understudied variable in determining when the United States will conduct a government-
biased military intervention. The results of the probit regression models show how important this 
variable is in the decision-making process. Ideal points outperformed all other variables in all 
Table 1. Probit Regression: U.S. Government-Biased Military Interventions in Intrastate Wars 
(1945-1999) (Robust Clusters) 
U.S. 
Interventions 
Model 1 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 2 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 3 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 4 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 5 
(Std. Err.) 
Model 6 
(Std. Err.) 
U.N. Roll Call 
(Ideal Points) 
-.938** 
(.416) 
-.940** 
(.418) 
-.974** 
(.416) 
-1.108*** 
(.409) 
--- --- 
Trade 
Dependence 
-13.552 
(12.266) 
-13.419 
(12.474) 
-12.632 
(12.371) 
-9.906 
(12.116) 
-6.175 
(10.622) 
2.536 
(9.807) 
Number of 
Borders 
-.062 
(.071) 
-.066 
(.067) 
-.057 
(.064) 
-.066 
(.063) 
-.062 
(.071) 
-.088 
(.071) 
Prior IGO 
interventions 
-.265* 
(.133) 
-.266* 
(.134) 
-.257* 
(.134) 
-.272** 
(.130) 
-.147 
(.098) 
-.183* 
(.096) 
Allied  
Status 
.432 
(.365) 
.409 
(.392) 
.395 
(.375 
--- .816** 
(.337) 
--- 
Average Polity 
Score 
-.001 
(.028) 
.000 
(.028) 
--- --- .008 
(.026) 
.015 
(.025) 
Rival Neighbor  -.061 
(.350) 
--- --- --- .002 
(.324) 
.121 
(.328) 
Constant 
 
.31535 
N=107 
Pseudo R
2
:
 
 
=.1428 
.30932 
N=107 
Pseudo R
2
: 
=.1433 
.27633 
N=111 
Pseudo R
2
: 
=.139 
.54729 
N=111 
Pseudo R
2
: 
=.128 
-.78885 
N=123 
Pseudo R
2
: 
=.098 
-.56703 
N=123 
Pseudo R
2
: 
=.0505 
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01   
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models. These findings provide strong support hypothesis 1: as political proximity decrease, so 
too will the probability of United States government-biased military intervention.  
I use a Stata program, Clarify, to determine the probability of U.S. government-biased 
military intervention. Figure 1 provides a graph of this near linear correlation. While holding all 
variables to their mean levels but adjusting the level of political proximity, I am able to 
determine the probability of United States government-biased military interventions. The results 
show that as a state moves away from the United States in its UNGA voting trends, so does the 
likelihood of government-biased military intervention. In relation to government-biased military 
interventions, political proximity is a determinate in the United States’ decision-making process.     
Prior IGO Interventions. Because IGOs are able to divide the costs of intervention with 
all of the members, IGOs are able to intervene in more costly endeavors. Prior IGO interventions 
therefore serve as a great indicator for the potential costs of a subsequent intervention. Further, 
prior interventions provide the United States with information regarding the likelihood of 
success. Therefore, with an increase in prior IGO interventions, the probability of United States 
 
Figure 1. 
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intervention should decrease. The probit regression results show this to be the case, and thus I 
find support for hypothesis 2. The coefficient points in the right direction, and it is significant, 
albeit at the .10 level. Therefore, this cost-predicting and success-predicting variable has a role in 
determining whether the United States will conduct a government-biased military intervention.   
There are, however, interesting dynamics occurring with regard to this variable, which 
could indicate that other endogenous elements not examined in this study might be skewing this 
finding, or other variables included in this study are intervening. It is unclear from the sources I 
consolidated these data from if prior IGO interventions include the United States in their 
coalition. If they did, then United States intervention, under the penumbra of an IGO 
intervention, has already occurred. Therefore, further United States involvement in the civil war 
would not be likely. Using the data I have to assess these claims, I can see that this might be the 
case.  
When I do not include ideal points, allied status gains importance, which I discuss below, 
and prior IGO interventions loses significance. When I do not include allied status but leave in 
ideal points, both ideal points and prior IGO interventions gain in significance. In fact, the p 
levels and the coefficients decrease when I remove allied status from the model.  Moreover, 
when I do not include ideal points or allied status, prior IGO intervention becomes significant. 
This shows that allied status might be influencing the significance of prior IGO interventions, 
which could indicate that the United States was involved in these prior interventions. That is, 
allied status could be an intervening variable in relation to prior IGO interventions and United 
States government-biased military interventions, or there could be a level of collinearity between 
these and other variables. To test for this, I ran a correlation model, presented in table 2, which 
indicates this is not the case. Table 2 shows that there is no covariance between prior IGO 
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interventions, allied status, or political proximity. However, the potential for an intervening 
effect with these factors is still a possibility, which requires further examination beyond the 
scope of the project. Nevertheless, these findings provide support for hypothesis 2; prior 
interventions seem to affect the likelihood of United States government-biased interventions. 
Trade dependence. Economic factors, imports and exports, drive many domestic policy 
decisions, but according to these data, they do not affect United States foreign policy decisions 
regarding government-biased military interventions. The results of the probit regression models 
are surprising in two ways. Not only is this factor insignificant, the coefficient in most models is 
in the opposite direction of what would make intuitive sense. Economic ties present an 
interesting problem however. Civil wars are not spontaneous events. The internal problems that 
lead to many civil wars develop over time. Minority group complaints of elite depravity fester 
and generate discontent. The run-up to civil war, the increased activity of agitated masses and 
propaganda, create an environment that might stifle economic ties and trade years before the 
outbreak of armed resistance. This may dampen the effects of economic elements in the years 
before a conflict reaches the 200 fatalities threshold. These problems require further examination 
and greater data collection efforts. Nevertheless, with the data collected for this study, I find no 
support for hypothesis 3. 
Liberal Democratic Ideals/Polity Scores. The average Polity IV scores of the nation 
throughout the conflict or until the United States intervened is the most underperforming variable 
Table 2: Correlation Table of Key Variables 
 U.N. Roll Call  
(Ideal Points) 
Allied  
Status 
Prior IGO  
Interventions 
U.N. Roll Call Votes 
(Ideal Points) 
1.000 --- --- 
Allied  
Status  
-0.389 1.000 --- 
Prior IGO  
Interventions 
0.094 -0.135 1.000 
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tested. It is insignificant and the coefficient is near or at zero in all models. To see if there is a 
measurement error creating these results, I ran two other models (not listed). In the first model, I 
took the states Polity IV score for the year prior to the start of the conflict. For the second model, 
I figured out the mean of the average scores in my original variable and took the difference from 
the mean for each of my observations. Neither of these models resulted in a significant 
correlation. With these results, I can rule out hypothesis 4; the level of democratic ideals present 
in a nation does not have an effect on the likelihood of United States government-biased military 
intervention. 
Shared Borders. The number of borders is not a leading factor in the United States’ 
decision to provide government-biased military aid. While the coefficient is in the right 
direction, the results show that an increase in the number of borders does not significantly reduce 
the probability of government-biased military intervention. Further, as I remove other potential 
intervening variables, there is little change in both the coefficient and significance level. 
Therefore, I find no support for hypothesis 5. 
Rival Neighbor. Much like the number of shared borders, having a rival neighbor can 
increase the likelihood that a rebel group will find cross-border sanctuary. This increases the 
duration and thus cost of the conflict and intervention. This, however, does not seem to matter to 
United States decision-makers. Similar to an increase in borders, results are in the right direction, 
but are insignificant. Further, after running models (not listed) in which potential intervening 
variables are removed, having a rival neighbor remains insignificant. Therefore, these findings 
seem to rule out hypothesis 6. 
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With these findings in hand, I explore the implications of the relationship between United 
States government-biased military intervention and political proximity. Once these implications 
are established, I conclude with a summary. 
Implications 
These results have stark implications regarding United States foreign policy. They show 
that the theories espoused by politicians in the United States for intervening on behalf of 
incumbent governments in civil wars serve as façades for the true cause—political proximity. 
Promoting democracy abroad and advancing the economic well-being and stability of the target 
state and the overall global order are often leading reasons political leaders in the United States 
give for their decisions to intervene in foreign internal conflicts. These ostensible causes, 
however, are little more than window dressings, serving to enhance the politicians standing with 
the public while the true causes for action remains behind closed doors.  
The stability of a nation is of some importance to the United States. This stability, 
however, is not dependent on maintaining or advancing either economic ties or liberal ideals nor 
is this stability a function of regional concerns. The United States is more concerned with 
stability when the state helps promote its global agenda.  
The findings of this study show that the decision to intervene, the decision to expend 
blood and/or treasure in another nation’s civil conflict, is made for realpolitik causes rather than 
for stability, economic, or moralistic concerns. These findings show the role realpolitik 
dimensions play in institutional politics. Moreover, these findings are in contrast to the projected 
outcomes of the more established theories, such as hegemonic stability and Kantian or 
democratic peace theories.  
37 
 
The United States often holds itself as the defender and promoter of the moral right, and 
its leaders portray its foreign policy as such. This study, however, shows that morally just liberal 
ideals and the advancement of the economies in these developing nations are not factors in 
determining whether a government will receive United States military aid in its fight against 
internal enemies. The findings of this study instead show the self-interested motives behind 
interventions. They show the interplay between power and politics in international institutions, 
such as the United Nations. They show the importance of institutional standing and politics in the 
realist political order. 
Conclusion 
This study sought to understand the relevant factors that decision-makers in the United 
States rely upon in determining whether to supply an incumbent government with military aid in 
its fight against an internal foe. In short, it sought to answer the question: Why intervene? To 
gain a greater understanding, I explored traditional as well as nontraditional answers to this 
problem. In doing so, I find that the most prevalent cause for United States government-biased 
military interventions is not one of the traditionally held causes, but rather an understudied 
nontraditional factor: political proximity.   
This study shows that a state’s preferences in the international political order, revealed 
through UNGA voting trends, serve to either implicitly align itself to or against the United 
States’ global agenda. These revealed preferences are significant factors in determining if the 
United States will intervene on behalf of the government. As governments move farther away 
from the United States on the political proximity scale, they are significantly less likely to 
receive military aid. Exploring the effects of political proximity on the decision to intervene 
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advances the literature on hegemonic relations with client states and establishes a new chapter in 
the intervention literature.    
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